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Résumé / Abstract 
 
 
Nous analysons un environnement de travail à deux tâches avec des individus neutres au 
risque, mais avec de l’aversion pour l’inégalité. L’effort de l’agent affecté à la tâche 2 est 
vérifiable, mais ne l’est pas pour l’agent dans la tâche 1. L’agent 1 est donc rémunéré sur la 
base d’un contrat incitatif, ce qui lui procure une rente qui est source de désutilité pour l’autre 
agent. L’aversion pour l’inégalité a un effet sur les contrats optimaux des deux agents. Elle 
réduit l’effort, le salaire et le gain net de l’agent 1, mais a des effets ambigus sur l’agent 2 
selon que les niveaux d’effort dans les deux tâches sont des substituts ou des compléments 
dans la fonction de production de l’entreprise. Cependant, une plus grande aversion pour 
l’inégalité a toujours pour effet de réduire la production totale et donc la productivité 
moyenne du travail.    
 





We analyze a two-task work environment with risk-neutral but inequality averse individuals. 
For the agent employed in task 2 effort is verifiable, while in task 1 it is not. Accordingly, 
agent 1 receives an incentive contract which, due to his wealth constraint, leads to a rent that 
the other agent resents. We show that inequality aversion affects the optimal contracts of both 
agents. Greater inequality aversion reduces the effort, wage and payoff of agent 1, while the 
effects on the wage and effort of agent 2 depend on whether effort levels across tasks are 
substitutes or complements in the firm's output function. However, more inequality aversion 
unambiguously decreases total output and therefore average labor productivity.  
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In a recent study, Brosnan and Waal (2003) analyzed the response of ca-
puchin monkeys to unequal pay. In the baseline test, two monkeys received
a token that could immediately be returned to the experimenter for a cu-
cumber. The monkeys exchanged successfully in 95 per cent of the cases.
In the next test, one monkey exchanged for cucumber and the other one for
grapes. Now more than 40 per cent of the monkeys that were rewarded with
cucumbers, the less favored reward, refused to exchange. The rejection rate
even increased to 80 per cent when the other monkey received the better
reward without any eﬀort (i.e. without having to hand over a token).
There is by now a plethora of papers in economics arguing that rejection
of unequal pay is not restricted to capuchin monkeys, but is probably just
as typical of human beings.1 According to these studies, individuals are not
entirely self-centered, but care about fairness and relative rewards. Thus,
workers may envy those who get a better deal and suﬀer disutility from being
treated ‘unfairly’. Conversely, they may also have empathic preferences and
dislike outperforming co-workers. In this paper we analyze some implications
of other-regarding preferences for optimal contract design. If ‘inequality
aversion’ diﬀers between socio-economic systems—e.g., Europe versus the
US—or even between corporate cultures, how would this be reﬂected in the
organization of work?
We consider the situation of a ﬁrm employing risk-neutral and wealth
constrained agents in two diﬀerent tasks or occupations. In one task, eﬀort—
respectively a perfectly correlated signal—is veriﬁable. In the other task it
is not, leading to moral hazard. For example, one may think of skilled
and unskilled labor, where the activity of the latter is less complex and,
therefore, relatively easy to verify. Alternatively, it may simply be that
some activities are inherently more diﬃcult to monitor than others; think
of sales representatives versus employees working in-house. Similarly, the
eﬀort of a manager is probably more diﬃcult to assess than that of a worker
at a conveyor belt.
In such a framework, providing incentives is costly for the principal. The
workers with non-veriﬁable eﬀort—category 1 agents—must be motivated
through some form of performance pay. This implies paying out rent be-
cause of the agents’ wealth constraint. By contrast, workers with veriﬁable
eﬀort—category 2 agents—receive a ﬁxed wage contract and no rent. If these
workers are inequality averse, they suﬀer disutility from the other agents’
rent and this requires compensation. This ‘inequality premium’ therefore
increases the ﬁrm’s costs of providing incentives to the agents with non
veriﬁable eﬀort.
1For recent surveys see Konow (2003), Camerer (2003) as well as Fehr and Schmidt
(2003).
2Accordingly, we ﬁnd that greater inequality aversion leads to smaller
eﬀort, wage and payoﬀ (i.e. wage minus eﬀort cost) for agents exerting tasks
subject to moral hazard. By contrast, the eﬀect on agents with veriﬁable
eﬀort is ambiguous. Greater inequality aversion does not necessarily mean
higher wages as compensation. The reason is that these workers’ equilibrium
eﬀort may decrease, remain constant or even increase, depending on whether
eﬀort levels are complements or substitutes across tasks in the principal’s
revenue function. Nevertheless, payoﬀ diﬀerences decrease with the extent of
inequality aversion. Wage diﬀerences also decrease unless tasks are strongly
complementary.
We also analyze the implications of an improvement in the monitoring
technology. Better monitoring or more informative performance measures
reduce the marginal cost of providing incentives to category 1 agents. As a
result, the ﬁrm requires that these agents exert more eﬀort. If this also leads
to a higher payoﬀ for these workers, then the payoﬀ for the other category of
workers must also increase due to the larger inequality premium. However,
it does so to a lesser extent so that overall inequality is larger.
There are several recent papers analyzing contracts with inequality averse
agents. Maybe the work most closely related to ours is Bartling and Siemens
(2003) who analyze an environment with one principal and two agents. How-
ever, agents in that model are risk averse and symmetric (see also Itoh 2004),
while in our paper they face a limited liability constraint and diﬀer in the
veriﬁability of their eﬀort. Furthermore, their analysis is considerably less
general in several aspects: agents perform the same task, there are only
two eﬀort levels and only two output realizations. Englmaier and Wambach
(2003) analyze sharing rules when an inequity averse agent compares his pay-
oﬀ to that of the principal. Siemens (2003) analyzes optimal employment
contracts in an adverse selection model. There are also some contributions
that analyze inequality aversion in the context of team production (e.g.,
Demougin and Fluet 2003).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model.
Sections 3 and 4 analyze the eﬀects of inequality aversion on eﬀort levels,
wages and payoﬀs. Section 5 expands the picture by adding monitoring to
the model. Finally, in the concluding section we discuss economic appli-
cations, in particular cross-country diﬀerences in productivity and mergers
among ﬁrms with diﬀerent corporate cultures.
2 The model
We consider a two-task work environment, assuming for simplicity that each
task occupies a single agent. The value of output for the ﬁrm is v(e1,e2),
an increasing and concave function where ei ∈ R+ is the eﬀort in task i or
equivalently the eﬀort of agent i, i = 1,2. Later in the text, we further char-
3acterize v(e1,e2) in terms of whether inputs are substitutes or complements.
All parties are risk-neutral and exerting eﬀort in task i costs ci(ei). We im-
pose the standard assumptions c0
i(ei), c00
i (ei) > 0 for ei > 0, ci(0) = c0
i(0) = 0
and limei→∞ c0
i(ei) = ∞, which ensure an interior solution.
Tasks diﬀer in the veriﬁability of eﬀort. We assume e2 is veriﬁable. The
principal therefore oﬀers agent 2 a contract specifying a ﬁxed wage payment
w and the desired eﬀort level, leading to the payoﬀ
π2 = w − c2(e2). (1)
By contrast, neither the value of output nor the eﬀort of agent 1 are
veriﬁable, implying moral hazard with respect to the ﬁrst task. However,
the parties observe a contractible signal s ∈ {0,1} where s = 1 is favorable
information about e1 (see Milgrom 1981).2 We denote with p(e1) the prob-
ability of the favorable outcome given the agent’s eﬀort, with p0(e1) > 0 and
p00(e1) ≤ 0.3 Given the binary nature of the signal, the incentive contract
for agent 1 reduces to a ﬁxed payment F and a bonus b which the agent
receives when s = 1. Agent 1’s expected payoﬀ is therefore
π1 = F + p(e1)b − c1(e1). (2)
Workers are assumed to be ﬁnancially constrained, otherwise the ﬁrst-
best would be feasible as is well known. To economize on notation, we simply
assume that wages must be non negative. Similarly, the agents’ reservation
utility is set equal to zero.
Inequality aversion captures the idea that a worker’s well-being depends
on how his expected payoﬀ compares to that of co-workers. Speciﬁcally, as
in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), agent i’s utility is written as
ui(πi,πj) = πi − βi max[πj − πi,0] − γi max[πi − πj,0]. (3)
The second term on the right hand side is the disutility from disadvan-
tageous inequality. Parameter βi ≥ 0 may be interpreted as the propensity
for envy. The agent is ‘envious’ in the sense that his utility is reduced if he
receives a lower expected payoﬀ than the other agent. The third term is the
disutility from advantageous inequality, with γi ≥ 0 as the parameter for
empathy. An agent feels ‘empathy’ if his utility is reduced when he receives
a higher payoﬀ than the other agent. We assume γi < 1 so that agents ex-
periencing empathy nevertheless prefer that their own payoﬀ increases, even
2The assumption s ∈ {0,1} is without loss of generality, as in the risk-neutral agency
problem all relevant information from a mechanism design point of view can be summa-
rized by a binary statistic (see, e.g., Kim 1997).
3These conditions guarantee that the agent’s problem is well behaved. They are equiv-
alent to considering binary signals satisfying MLRC and CDFC within the class of diﬀer-
entiable signals with constant support.
4when this also increases inequality. To simplify notation in what follows, we
write
ui(πi,πj) = πi − αi(πj − πi), with αi =

βi if πi ≤ πj
−γi if πi > πj.
(4)




v(e1,e2) − w − F − bp(e1), (5)
subject to participation of agents 1 and 2, incentive compatibility for the
non-veriﬁable eﬀort of agent 1, as well as limited liability:
π1 − α1(π2 − π1) ≥ 0, (PC1)
π2 − α2(π1 − π2) ≥ 0, (PC2)
p0(e1)b − c0
1(e1) = 0, (IC1)
w, F, F + b ≥ 0. (LL)




F +p(˜ e1)b−c1(˜ e1)−α1[w−c2(e2)−F −p(˜ e1)b+c1(˜ e1)]. (6)












Observe that the bonus for agent 1 is independent of the inequality
aversion parameters, given the required level of eﬀort. Noting that b > 0,
and since w ≥ 0 follows from agent 2’s participation constraint, the limited
liability constraints reduce to F ≥ 0. After substitution, the Lagrangian
becomes
L(·) = v(e1,e2) − w − F − B(e1)
+λ(F + B(e1) − c1(e1) − α1[w − c2(e2) − F − B(e1) + c1(e1)])
+µ(w − c2(e2) − α2[F + B(e1) − c1(e1) − w + c2(e2)]) + ξF.
5Given an interior solution, equilibrium values satisfy the following ﬁrst-
order conditions with respect to e1, e2, w and F, together with the comple-
mentary slackness conditions and non-negativity of multipliers λ,µ,ξ:
ve1 − c0
1(e1)[λ(1 + α1) − µα2] − B0(e1)[1 − λ(1 + α1) + µα2] = 0, (9)
ve2 + c0
2(e2)[λα1 − µ(1 + α2)] = 0, (10)
−1 − λα1 + µ(1 + α2) = 0, (11)
−1 + λ(1 + α1) − µα2 + ξ = 0, (12)
where vei denotes the partial derivative ∂v(e1,e2)/∂ei. We ﬁrst derive two
lemmas which greatly simplify the characterization of the equilibrium.
Lemma 1 The participation constraint of agent 2 always binds and π1 ≥
π2, so that α1 ≤ 0 and α2 > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In words, if inequality aversion matters with respect to the contracts
oﬀered by the ﬁrm, this can only be due to the fact that agent 2, the worker
with the observable eﬀort, is envious of agent 1 and possibly also because
agent 1 feels empathy for agent 2. Of course, the issue of envy or empathy
can be relevant only if payoﬀs are unequal in equilibrium.
Lemma 2 The participation constraint of agent 1 never binds and F = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, agent 1 gets a rent due to the moral hazard problem and
because of his binding limited liability constraint. Given F = 0, this agent’s
payment reduces to the bonus b paid in the case of favorable realizations of
the signal. Recalling that the bonus depends only on the required eﬀort and
not on inequality aversion, the extent to which agent 1 feels empathy does
not directly aﬀect the contract he is oﬀered, although empathy will reduce
his utility and hence his actual rent. In the proof of the lemma, the fact
that the rent remains positive despite empathy is shown to follow from the
assumption α1 > −1; that is, an agent prefers that his own payoﬀ increases
even if this also increases inequality. To complete the preceding results, we
show that agent 1’s payoﬀ is indeed strictly greater than that of agent 2.
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, u1 > u2 and π1 > π2.
The ﬁrst statement follows directly from the lemmas. Using (4), u1 > u2
is equivalent to
π1(1 + α1 + α2) > π2(1 + α1 + α2), (13)
where 1+α1+α2 > 0 since α1 > −1 and α2 > 0, thereby implying π1 > π2.
63 Eﬀort and inequality aversion
From lemma 1 we know that the participation constraint of agent 2 binds.
Hence, we can solve PC2 for the wage
w = c2(e2) +
α2
1 + α2
[B(e1) − c1(e1)]. (14)
Agent 2 is compensated for his eﬀort cost and for the disutility he suﬀers
from the larger net payoﬀ earned by agent 1. We henceforth refer to the
latter term as the ‘inequality premium’.




v(e1,e2) − c2(e2) −
α2
1 + α2
[B(e1) − c1(e1)] − B(e1). (15)
The ﬁrst term represents the beneﬁts of inducing eﬀort. The next two
terms are the wage of agent 2. The ﬁnal term is the expected bonus paid to
agent 1, who is compensated for his eﬀort cost c1(e1) and receives the net
payoﬀ B(e1) − c1(e1).













B0(e1) = 0 (16)
ve2(e1,e2) − c0
2(e2) = 0. (17)
It follows immediately that the empathy parameter of agent 1, α1, has no
eﬀect on equilibrium values. The reason is simply that this agent’s participa-
tion constraint does not bind, as shown in the preceding section. Empathy
reduces the agent’s utility, but does not aﬀect the cost to the ﬁrm of induc-
ing eﬀort. Thus, it is only agent 2’s propensity for envy, α2, that will matter
in equilibrium. Accordingly, when we refer to an increase in inequality aver-
sion, we shall mean an increase in the propensity for envy, irrespective of
whether the propensity for empathy also increases.
A larger α2 makes it more costly for the principal to provide incentives to
agent 1, since it increases the compensation that must be paid to the envious
agent 2. The ﬁrm therefore adjusts by requiring less eﬀort from agent 1,
which means a lower powered contract with a smaller bonus. Diﬀerentiating
the equilibrium conditions and applying Cramer’s rule yields (see Appendix),
de1
dα2
= ϕ(ve2e2 − c00


























7and where veiej denotes the cross partial derivative.
To see that the signs are correct, note that the denominator in (19)
is positive from the second-order condition for a maximum.4 From the
deﬁnition of the expected bonus and the curvature assumptions, it is easily
veriﬁed that B0(e1) > c0
1(e1). The signs then follow from the concavity of
the output function and the convexity of the cost functions.
Turning to agent 2, observe from (14) that a larger α2 increases the
inequality premium, which depends on e1, but does not directly aﬀect the
marginal costs of inducing eﬀort e2. However, there is an indirect eﬀect if
ve1e2 6= 0, which results from changes in the equilibrium eﬀort of agent 1.
If ve1e2 > 0, then as e1 falls so do marginal returns to the complementary
input e2; hence a lower e2 becomes optimal. By contrast, if ve1e2 < 0, then
the lower e1 increases marginal returns to e2 and requiring more eﬀort from
agent 2 becomes optimal. Formally, again using Cramer’s rule,
de2
dα2
= −ϕve1e2 . (20)
Finally, we show that more inequality aversion reduces total output in
equilibrium or equivalently that it leads to a fall in the average productivity










= ϕ(ve1ve2e2 − ve2ve1e2 − ve1c00
2) < 0, (21)
where the sign of the expression in parenthesis follows from the concavity
of the output function.5 We summarize the results of this section in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 More inequality aversion reduces equilibrium output and the
eﬀort of agent 1. The eﬀort of agent 2 decreases (increases) if the cross
derivative ve1e2 is positive (negative).
4 Wages and payoﬀs
We now analyze how inequality aversion aﬀects wages and payoﬀ diﬀerences.



















4The denominator is the determinant of the Hessian of the objective function, which
must be positive for a regular interior maximum.





















8Recall that agent 2’s wage consists of the inequality premium and the
compensation for eﬀort cost. The ﬁrst term in (22) describes the direct
eﬀect of an increase in α2; that is, the increase of agent 2’s inequality pre-
mium when holding e1 ﬁxed. The second term is the indirect eﬀect on the
inequality premium that works via the induced change in e1. In particular,
as e1 falls, the net payoﬀ B(e1)−c1(e1) of agent 1 decreases, implying that
there is less to be envious about. Accordingly, this eﬀect reduces agent 2’s
inequality premium. Without a further speciﬁcation of functional forms it
is therefore unclear whether changes in α2 increase or reduce the inequality
premium. Finally, from proposition 2 we know that e2 remains unchanged
only if ve1e2 = 0. In all other cases there will be a third eﬀect as changes in
α2 aﬀect agent 2’s eﬀort and therefore his eﬀort cost.
Despite the ambiguous eﬀect of inequality aversion on the wage and
payoﬀ of agent 2, payoﬀ diﬀerentials always decrease in α2. This is also
the case for wage diﬀerentials, unless ve1e2 has a large negative value. The
reason is that the ‘wage’ of agent 1—the expected bonus B(e1)—as well as
his payoﬀ unambiguously decrease in α2 and this eﬀect usually dominates.
Substituting from (1), (2) and (14), the payoﬀ diﬀerential is given by
















2 < 0. (24)
The intuition is simply that payoﬀ diﬀerentials become more costly as
inequality aversion increases. The wage diﬀerential is obtained by adding
c1(e1) − c2(e2) to (23). Obviously, agent 1’s eﬀort and associated costs de-
crease in α2. Therefore, unless the eﬀort cost of agent 2 falls by a substan-
tially larger amount, which is only possible if ve1e2 > 0 so that de2/dα2 < 0
(see proposition 2), wage diﬀerentials must also decrease. We summarize
the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 More inequality aversion reduces the wage and payoﬀ of
agent 1 and leads to smaller payoﬀ diﬀerences between agents. Wage diﬀer-
ences also decrease, unless e1 and e2 are strongly complementary.
5 Monitoring and spillovers
The consideration of inequality aversion leads to interesting feed-back eﬀects.
For instance, suppose that for some exogenous reason the technology used
to monitor the category 1 worker improves. Improvements in information
9technology suggest that such a development may actually have taken place
over the last two decades or so (see Garicano 2000).
In the absence of inequality aversion, this would only aﬀect the agent
who receives an incentive contract. This changes once we allow for inequality
aversion. Let θ represent the monitoring technology. A better technology
aﬀects the probability with which a good signal is observed. As a result,
the expected bonus B(e1,θ) for inducing a given eﬀort level now becomes a
function of θ. Intuitively, with better monitoring the ﬁrm can elicit a desired
eﬀort level with a smaller expected bonus. Furthermore, the marginal cost
to the ﬁrm of inducing additional eﬀort should decrease in θ. Therefore, we
assume Bθ(e1,θ) < 0 and Be1θ(e1,θ) < 0.6





































The latter, again applying Cramer’s rule, is obtained from the equilibrium
conditions (16) and (17) rewritten so as to incorporate monitoring (the de-
nominator in (26) is positive by the second-order condition). As in the
preceding section, the eﬀect on e2 depends solely on the sign of the cross
derivative ve1e2.
A better monitoring technology has two eﬀects on agent 1’s payoﬀ. First,
the bonus that is required to induce a desired eﬀort level falls. Secondly,
better monitoring technology implies that it becomes optimal for the princi-
pal to induce more eﬀort. As a result, the overall eﬀect on the agent’s payoﬀ
is ambiguous.7







The payoﬀ of agent 2 is simply his inequality premium, by which he is com-
pensated for envying the payoﬀ of agent 1. Obviously, the required compen-
sation increases in agent 1’s payoﬀ and this spillover is larger the greater the
degree of inequality aversion α2. The next result follows straightforwardly.
6See Demougin and Fluet (2001) for a general formulation.
7To provide an example, π1 increases if c1(e1) = 0.5e
2
1 and p(e1,θ) = e
θ
1, where e1,θ ∈
[0,1]. See Demougin and Fluet (2001) for a justiﬁcation of this speciﬁcation of monitoring
technology.
10Proposition 4 If an improvement in the technology to monitor agent 1
increases (decreases) the payoﬀ of this agent, then the payoﬀ of agent 2 and
payoﬀ diﬀerences also increase (decrease). Spillovers are greater, the greater
the degree of inequality aversion.
6 Concluding remarks and discussion
This paper has analyzed a simple two-task environment in which a ﬁrm
employs two wealth constrained agents. For agent 2, eﬀort is veriﬁable,
while for agent 1 it is not. Accordingly, only agent 1 receives an incentive
contract, which leads to a positive rent and a payoﬀ that the other agent
resents. Inequality aversion aﬀects the optimal contracts of both agents.
In particular, more inequality aversion on the part of agent 2 reduces the
eﬀort, wage and payoﬀ of agent 1. It also leads to a compression of payoﬀs. If
the principal’s revenue is additively separable in the agents’ eﬀort, then the
eﬀort of agent 2 remains unchanged, but wage diﬀerences decrease. Finally,
an improvement in the monitoring technology aﬀects the payoﬀ of both
agents in the same direction, but eﬀects on agent 1 are more pronounced.
The analysis may help understand diﬀerences in productivity and wage
spread across countries with diﬀerent cultural norms. For example, there
is some empirical evidence that preferences for a more equal income distri-
bution are stronger in Western Europe than they are in the United States
(Corneo 2001; Alesina, Tella, and MacCulloch 2003; Schwarze and H¨ arpfer
2003). There is also evidence that productivity is lower in Western Europe
than in the US (e.g. Hall and Jones 1999). Our paper provides a possible
explanation for this pattern although there are, of course, alternative ones
(e.g., Bental and Demougin 2003).
The analysis is also useful to understand problems that may arise in
mergers because of diﬀerent corporate cultures. Though corporate cultures
are multifaceted constructs, one important aspect is the degree to which
employees ﬁnd an unequal income distribution acceptable. For example,
one reason why the merger between Daimler Benz and Chrysler Corpora-
tion started oﬀ rocky was that senior executives at Daimler earned a lot less
than their Chrysler counterparts. Even J¨ urgen Schrempf, CEO of Daim-
lerChrysler, acknowledged “it’s a major problem” (Schellhardt 1999). To
narrow the gap, pay packages to Daimler managers were substantially in-
creased.
This pattern nicely conforms with our analysis. For instance, consider
the merger between two ﬁrms, each of which has a structure as described
in the present paper. Suppose employees in ﬁrm H are more inequality
averse than those in ﬁrm L. Unless there are substantial diﬀerences in rev-
enue or eﬀort cost functions, ﬁrm L would have paid higher wages to and
required more eﬀort from category 1 employees than ﬁrm H (by proposi-
11tion 2). Moreover, ﬁrm L would have been characterized by larger payoﬀ
diﬀerences (by proposition 3).
To focus on merger costs that arise from inequality aversion, consider
the costs of implementing the eﬀort levels that existed before the merger. In
our simpliﬁed framework it seems reasonable to assume that employees will
compare their payoﬀ with that of the highest paid employee in the merged
ﬁrm. Accordingly, the wage of the type 1 employee in ﬁrm H will increase
because he now envies the type 1 employee in ﬁrm L. Similarly, the wage of
the type 2 employee in ﬁrm H also increases because the diﬀerence between
his payoﬀ and that of the best paid employee has increased. More so, his
wage would even increase if he continued to compare himself to the payoﬀ
of the type 1 employee in his original ﬁrm.
Note that there is no opposite eﬀect in the other ﬁrm, where the costs
of implementing pre-merger eﬀort levels remain constant. Accordingly, our
analysis predicts an upward adjustment of wages in the merged ﬁrm, just
as it happened in the DaimlerChrysler example. Obviously, this discussion
neglects that ﬁrms may adjust eﬀort levels after the merger. Furthermore,
the merger may have positive eﬀects on the revenue function. Nevertheless,
the analysis shows that it is often not possible for the merged ﬁrm to simply
replicate the behavior of the previously separate ﬁrms if diﬀerent corporate
cultures continue to prevail.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, contrary to the ﬁrst claim in the lemma, that
µ = 0. Then by (11) λα1 < 0 so that λ > 0 and α1 < 0. Hence, PC1 binds
and u1 = 0. Agent 2’s participation constraint can therefore be written as
u1 ≤ u2. Upon substitution from (4),
π1(1 + α1 + α2) ≤ π2(1 + α1 + α2). (28)
From the deﬁnition of the αi’s, it is not possible for α1 and α2 to be both
negative. Hence α2 > 0. Furthermore, α1 > −1 by assumption. Therefore,
1 + α1 + α2 > 0 and (28) implies π2 ≥ π1. But this in turn implies α1 ≥ 0
(see 4). Hence λα1 ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Furthermore, given µ > 0 the participation constraint of agent 2 binds
and u1 ≥ u2. Accordingly, the inequality sign in (28) is reversed, which
proves the second claim in the lemma. Therefore, the only relevant forms of
inequality aversion are ‘empathy’ (α1 ≤ 0) for agent 1 and ‘envy’ (α2 > 0)
for agent 2. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose to the contrary that PC1 binds. Solving PC2
for π2 and substitution into PC1 yields
π1(1 + α1) −
α1α2
1 + α2
π1 = 0. (29)
12Since 1 + α1 > 0 and given that α1α2/(1 + α2) ≤ 0 by lemma 1, this
can only be satisﬁed if π1 = 0. Denote the signal elasticity by (e1) =
e1p0(e1)/p(e1) and observe that (e1) ∈ [0,1] by concavity of p(e1). Upon
substitution and noting that e1c0







a contradiction to π1 = 0 (see equation (2)). Finally, to prove F = 0, note
that from (11) and (12),
λ =
1 + 2α2 − (1 + α2)ξ
1 + α1 + α2
. (31)
Accordingly, a non-binding participation constraint for agent 1 (λ = 0)
implies ξ > 0, hence F = 0. 2
Calculation of de1/dα2. Denoting the principal’s objective function (15) by















Fe1e1Fe2e2 − (Fe1e2)2. (32)
Upon substitution, this yields (18) and (19). Calculation of de2/dα2 and
de1/dθ proceeds in the same way.
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